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ABSTRACT
In this article, I first contextualize the origins of disagreement over the nature and extent of human embryonic stem cell
(hESC) research regulation. By analyzing two key pieces of
hESC legislation as considered in two landmark court decisions—one from the United States and one from the European
Union—I argue that current stem cell policies are deeply flawed.
After surfacing the flaws of these policies, I examine novel challenges for policymakers posed by the newest advancement in
stem cell science, induced pluripotent stem cells. In view of these
novel challenges, I contend that current policies, which are
hESC-focused and deeply flawed, will require substantial revision so as to not unnecessarily encumber the ever-growing therapeutic promise of stem cell research.
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There is no twilight zone beyond the boundaries of a rigorously defined community of moral persons where we may act irrespective of
normative rules and unscrupulously tamper with things. If, on the
other hand, the interpretation of morally saturated legal terms like
“human right” and “human dignity” tends to be counterintuitively
construed in too broad a sense, they will not only lose their power to
provide clear conceptual distinctions, but also their critical potential.1

I.

INTRODUCTION

Most discussions of stem cell research begin on a historical
note. I shall not differ in this regard. I do not, however, begin
with mention of the derivation of the first stable human embryonic stem cell (hESC) line, which dates to 1998, to note mere
historical fact.2 Rather, I make mention of it here, in an article
that is concerned with nuanced legislative flaws and an emerging branch of stem cell science theretofore unheard of in 1998,
for the benefit of a contextual point that is noticeably absent in
the literature. We now seem to take for granted the heightened
presence of complex science in the policymaking and judicial
realms.3 In our era of emerging issues in, inter alia, genetic
testing, gene therapy, and neuroscience, stem cells can seem
rather ordinary.
But, in 1998, such a discovery was far from ordinary, not
because it captured some ineffable wonderment at the possibilities of science—though it arguably did—but because it had a
distinctly human component. Notwithstanding the marvel at
1. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN NATURE 36 (William
Rehg et al. trans., 2003).
2. See James A. Thomson et al., Embryonic Stem Cell Lines Derived from
Human Blastocysts, 282 SCI. 1145, 1145 (1998); see also Michael J. Shamblott
et al., Derivation of Pluripotent Stem Cells from Cultured Human Primordial
Germ Cells, 95 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. AM. 13,726, 13,726 (1998). The
derivation of the first stable hESC line occurred concurrently by two labs, one
under the leadership of James Thomson at the University of Wisconsin and
the other under the leadership of John Gearhart at Johns Hopkins. These two
citations denote the publication of their respective findings. Notable to the issue of federal funding for hESC research, to which I will devote substantial
discussion, Thomson and his team made this discovery in a privately funded
laboratory, created to keep their research separate from other publicly funded
research at the University of Wisconsin. RONALD M. GREEN, BABIES BY
DESIGN: THE ETHICS OF GENETIC CHOICE 206 (2007).
3. See generally William G. Childs, The Overlapping Magisteria of Law
and Science: When Litigation and Science Collide, 85 NEB. L. REV. 643 (2007)
(discussing science in the courts); Daniel Gervais, The Regulation of Inchoate
Technologies, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 665 (2010) (discussing regulatory challenges
posed by new and rapidly developing technologies).
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the cloning of Dolly in 1996, she was, after all, a sheep, which is
to say that scientists at the University of Edinburgh had not
cloned a human being.4 Yet, for hESC research, its therapeutic
promise was immediately broadcasted.5 Lauded as holding the
promise of treating Parkinson’s disease, heart disease, spinal
cord injuries, diabetes, and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS),
amongst a growing list of devastating medical conditions, it
was at the time easy to feel that hESC research could do something for us in a way that biotechnology had theretofore been
unable to do.6
I stress the novelty and significance of this discovery to
suggest that much of the trouble that besets stem cell policies,
which will constitute the focus of this article, originates in relation to this ‘ethic of healing.’7 Thorny, persistent questions agitate our ethic of healing. What is the moral status of the human embryo? If, as most agree, human embryos ought to be
accorded at least some measure of respect, under what circumstances, if any, may they be destroyed?8 May legislatures or judiciaries properly comment on these moral inquiries? More
pointedly, may a particular stance on morality vis-à-vis stem
cell research be codified? Should morally controversial science
receive federal funding? Should such science enjoy patent protection? Our ethic of healing is not unbounded. The flaws of

4. Gina Kolata, Scientist Reports First Cloning Ever of Adult Mammal,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1997, at A1.
5. Daisy A. Robinton & George Q. Daley, The Promise of Induced Pluripotent Stem Cells in Research and Therapy, 48 NATURE 295, 302–03 (2012).
6. Id.
7. The phrase ‘ethic of healing’ originates in Banchoff. See THOMAS
BANCHOFF, EMBRYO POLITICS: ETHICS AND POLICY IN ATLANTIC DEMOCRACIES
128–38 (2011). Banchoff discusses how the foci of the scientific and bioethical
community through the mid-1990s had been improved in vitro (IVF) technologies and accumulating greater knowledge of genetics and congenital disease.
Id. at 130. The emergence of embryo research, however, turned the focus to
developing stem cell therapies, as motivated by “[a]n appeal to solidarity with
the sick.” Id. Banchoff defines the ethic of healing as referring to “the argument that healing potential necessitate[s] research . . . and that research that
destroy[s] embryos [i]s compatible with respect for them.” Id. at 132. This shift
within the bioethical community, therefore, was one of affording central focus
to the “alleviation of suffering more than infertility-related issues . . . .” Id.
8. See, e.g., Janet L. Dolginet et al., Attitudes About Human Embryos,
Embryonic Stem Cell Research, and Related Matters, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 319,
app. II.A (2008); KATHY L. HUDSON ET AL., VALUES IN CONFLICT: PUBLIC
ATTITUDES ON EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH 5 (2005), available at
http://www.dnapolicy.org/images/reportpdfs/2005ValuesInConflict.pdf.

DIAMOND_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

2/11/2013 10:46 AM

THE FLAWS OF STEM CELL LEGISLATION

263

stem cell legislation originate, more specifically, in the tension
between our ethic of healing and the bounds imposed by moral
inquiry.
For all its heady progress, hESC research has been beset
by many difficulties over the past twenty-five years.9 To be
sure, some of these difficulties can be attributed to the many
complexities inherent in the science itself.10 Others, however,
can be attributed to the ramifications of governmental restrictions on the nature and funding of hESC research, particularly in the United States.11 As I will demonstrate, these restrictions exhibit at their core the moral uncertainty that
pushes against, and thereby reigns in the bounds of, our ethic
of healing. For biotechnology, hESC research is the first, and
arguably most complex, instance in which science policy has
had the unpropitious task of obliging our ethic of healing while
balancing an inseparably pluralistic gamut of moral opinion.
In 2007, the landscape of stem cell research radically
changed when multiple laboratories reported the establishment
of human induced pluripotent stem cells (iPSCs).12 Despite
some differences, iPSCs and hESCs are in fact very similar.13
As Yamanaka states, “If anything, we should perhaps be wondering why iPSCs and ESCs are in fact so similar despite their
different origins and generation methods.”14 For many, however, these very differences offer the hope of obviating two chief
difficulties that hESC research has as yet been unable to surmount, namely, intrinsic therapeutic limitations and politically
and ethically complicated origins.15 While some contend that
iPSCs will eventually render hESCs insignificant,16 at present
9. John A. Robertson, Embryo Stem Cell Research: Ten Years of Controversy, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 191, 194–96 (2010).
10. Robinton & Daley, supra note 5, at 295–96 (2012).
11. Id.
12. Kazutoshi Takahashi et al., Induction of Pluripotent Stem Cells from
Adult Human Fibroblasts by Defined Factors, 131 CELL 861, 861 (2007);
Junying Yu et al., Induced Pluripotent Stem Cells Derived from Human Somatic Cells, 318 SCI. 1917, 1917 (2007).
13. Shinya Yamanaka, Induced Pluripotent Stem Cells: Past, Present, and
Future, 10 CELL STEM CELL 678, 681 (2012).
14. Id.
15. Douglas Sipp, Gold Standards in the Diamond Age: The Commodification of Pluripotency, 5 CELL STEM CELL 360, 360 (2009).
16. David G. Zacharias et al., The Science and Ethics of Induced Pluripotency: What Will Become of Embryonic Stem Cells?, 86 MAYO CLINIC PROC.
634, 638 (2011). Thomson has expressed that, if research advances enough
such that there is no discernible difference between hESCs and iPSCs, then
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hESCs remain integral fixtures in the research landscape as
the “gold standard.”17 In view of the unstable history of hESC
policy,18 as well as the rapid pace at which stem cell science advances,19 iPSCs present a significant, but more to the point,
novel, challenge in coming years.
I will assess the current state of stem cell policies through
analysis of two recent court decisions and the policies upon
which both are based. My intent is to show that this legislation
is deeply flawed. The first case, Sherley v. Sebelius, was decided
by the D.C. Circuit in 2012.20 The second case, Brüstle v.
Greenpeace, decided in 2011, comes from the Court of Justice of
the European Union (ECJ).21 I focus on these particular decisions for two reasons. First, they accent the dissimilar central
issues in stem cell policies between the United States and the
European Union. Sherley turns on the recurrent issue of federal
funding for stem cell research in the U.S., which has to date
varied, oftentimes significantly, across three presidential administrations.22 Brüstle highlights the difficulties inherent in
promoting harmonization of biotechnological patents across EU
nation states that are themselves culturally and socially distinct.23 Second, as I will consider in some depth, the policies
underlying these two cases demonstrate the influence of moral
opinion on stem cell legislation.
Critical though such an analysis is, the revelation that

hESCs will “turn out to be a historical anomaly.” David Cyranoski, Stem Cells:
5 Things to Know Before Jumping on the iPS Bandwagon, 452 NATURE 406,
408 (2008).
17. See Sipp, supra note 15, at 360 (“The commodification of pluripotency
by the arrival of iPSCs has not entirely diluted the value of the ESC, which is
still generally held to be the ‘gold standard’ by which all pluripotency should
be judged . . . .”); Zacharias et al., supra note 16, at 638 (“The general consensus among hES and iPS researchers alike is that ES cells are needed for the
time being.”).
18. Robertson, supra note 9, at 194–96.
19. See Timeline: A Brief History of Stem Cell Research, SCI. PROGRESS,
http://scienceprogress.org/2009/01/timeline-a-brief-history-of-stem-cellresearch (last updated May 2012).
20. Sherley v. Sebelius (Sherley VI), 689 F.3d 776, 776 (D.C. Cir. 2012),
petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Oct. 10, 2012) (No. 12-454).
21. Case C-34/10, Brüstle v. Greenpeace e.V., 2011 EUR-Lex CELEX
LEXIS 2599 (Oct. 18, 2011).
22. Sherley v. Sebelius (Sherley I), 686 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5–7 (D.D.C. 2009).
See also Robertson, supra note 9, at 194–96.
23. Brüstle, 2011 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 2599, ¶ 55–56.
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stem cell policies are deeply flawed might be unsurprising to
some. I can find no example in the literature that unequivocally
extols the virtues of current stem cell policies. This is not insignificant, chiefly because current policies will soon need to adapt
to the results of the rapid pace at which stem cell science progresses. In the final section of this article, I will argue that the
unsupported current policies have yet another flaw, namely, an
inability to account for novel challenges posed by iPSCs. By
considering fundamental differences between hESCs and iPSCs, largely with regard to their distinct origins and moral
complexities, I conclude that current policies must adapt to the
changing science that they regulate, should the full therapeutic
potential of stem cell research ever be realized.
II. A BRIEF INTERLUDE: THE SCIENCE OF STEM CELLS
This article presumes a basic familiarity with the science of
stem cells. In the interest of this presumption, I will offer a rudimentary exposition on fundamental terms and distinctions in
the science of stem cells. What follows does not purport to be an
exhaustive overview, but rather constitutes a sufficient minimum for understanding of the policy and legal dimensions of
the science discussed herein.
At present, the scope of stem cell research includes three
different types of stem cells: adult stem cells (ASCs), hESCs,
and iPSCs.24 Research on ASCs is the oldest of the three, dating to the 1950s.25 ASCs are undifferentiated cells found in
adult tissues and organs in the body amongst already differentiated cells.26 ASCs are multipotent, which means that they can
be specialized into but a few different cell types.27 As such, the
utility of ASCs for research and therapeutic purposes is greatly
limited.28 For researchers using ASCs, the area of the body
from which the ASCs were harvested limits the utility of the

24. Layla Cummings, Note, Sherley v. Sebelius: A Call to Congress to Explicitly Support Medical Research on Human Embryonic Stem Cells, 12 N.C.
J.L. & TECH. 77, 79 (2010), available at http://www.ncjolt.org/sites/default/
files/Cummings_v12OE_77_96.pdf.
25. Id. at 80.
26. Ryan P. O’Quinn, Note, Sherley v. Sebelius: Stem Cells and the Uneasy Interplay Between the Federal Bench and the Lab Bench, 2011 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. 002, ¶ 7 (2011), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1216&context=dltr.
27. Cummings, supra note 24, at 80.
28. Id.
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cell.29 For instance, neural stem cells in the brain can replace
neurons in the nervous system, but neural stem cells are unable to become heart, liver, or lung cells, to mention just a few.30
In contrast to hESCs, ASCs are considered uncontroversial because harvesting them does not require the use and subsequent
destruction of human embryos.31
hESCs are found in the embryonic layer of week-old human embryos.32 Unlike ASCs, which have limited utility,
hESCs are pluripotent, which means that they can divide into
nearly any type of cell in the human body, but do not have the
capacity to develop into an independent, fully functional organism, e.g., a human being.33 In contrast to ASCs, which are harvested with the informed consent of adult donors,34 hESCs are
harvested from human embryos—in most cases, surplus preimplantation embryos from in vitro fertilization (IVF) procedures—which have been donated for research purposes with
the informed consent of both parents.35 The process of harvesting hESCs from a donated embryo necessitates the destruction
of the embryo.36 Opinion as to the moral status of the human
embryo differs widely.37 Because human embryos are necessarily destroyed during the harvesting of hESCs, such research is
considered morally and politically controversial.38 While the
full therapeutic potential of hESCs has not yet been fully realized, promising research results exist in animal studies of Parkinson’s disease, spinal injury, type 1 diabetes, and cardiovascular disease.39
iPSCs are the result of genetically reprogramming ASCs to

29. Id.
30. Amanda Warren-Jones, Realising New Health Technologies: Problems
of Regulating Human Stem Cells in the USA, 20 MED. L. REV. 540, 545 (2012).
31. Cummings, supra note 24, at 80.
32. Ryan Fujikawa, Note, Federal Funding of Human Embryonic Stem
Cell Research: An Institutional Examination, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1078
(2005).
33. Id. at 1078; see also Cummings, supra note 24, at 79–80; WarrenJones, supra note 30, at 7.
34. Cummings, supra note 24, at 80.
35. ROBERT P. GEORGE & CHRISTOPHER TOLLEFSEN, EMBRYO: A DEFENSE
OF HUMAN LIFE 8–11 (2011).
36. O’Quinn, supra note 26, ¶ 6.
37. HUDSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 8.
38. Id.
39. Zacharias et al., supra note 16, at 635.
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behave like hESCs, which is to say that they have the utility of
pluripotency.40 Being that ASCs are more abundant than
hESCs, iPSCs stand to make pluripotency theoretically limitless.41 Notwithstanding this potential spike in the availability
of pluripotency, current research suggests that iPSCs and
hESCs will complement one another, rather than having iPSCs
negate the need for hESCs, which had been hypothesized in
early iPSC research publications.42 At minimum, the ability to
alter the fate of ASCs through reprogramming has changed researchers’ views on the stability of cellular identity, thereby
spurring new directions in research possibilities.43 iPSC technology, however, has not yet been perfected.44 Ultimately, researchers hope that encouraging advancements made in recent
years augur well the chance that iPSCs will eventually offer
the therapeutic benefits that hESCs have been slow to provide.45
III. THE FLAWS OF SHERLEY V. SEBELIUS AND THE
DICKEY-WICKER AMENDMENT
In this section, I first consider the history of Sherley v.
Sebelius. Sherley has an uncommonly complex case history, totaling six separate and important instantiations in the federal
courts. Owing to this complexity, I will trace its case history in
detail, emphasizing those points along the way that bear heavily on the overall trajectory of its march through the courts. Af-

40. O’Quinn, supra note 26, ¶ 7.
41. Sipp, supra note 15, at 360.
42. Robinton & Daley, supra note 5, at 295, 300; see also Owen C.B.
Hughes et al., United States Regulation of Stem Cell Research: Recasting Government’s Role and Questions to be Resolved, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 383, 419
(2008) (“[I]n the short run many scientists believe that work with hESCs must
continue, if not only to validate the value of iPSCs . . . .”).
43. Robinton & Daley, supra note 5, at 295.
44. Zacharias et al., supra note 16, at 637.
45. Id. Examples of iPSC research promise have been coming rapidly. See,
e.g., David Cyranoski, Rudimentary Liver Grown in Vitro, NATURE NEWS (Jun.
21,
2012),
http://www.nature.com/news/rudimentary-liver-grown-in-vitro1.10848 (evincing developments towards growing a human liver in vitro); David Cyranoski, Biologists Grow Human-Eye Precursor from Stem Cells,
NATURE NEWS (Jun. 15, 2012), http://www.nature.com/news/biologists-growhuman-eye-precursor-from-stem-cells-1.10835 (relating the growing of the
precursor of a human eye in the laboratory); Ewem Callaway, Alzheimer’s ‘in a
Dish’ Shows Promise, NATURE NEWS (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.nature.com/
news/alzheimer-s-in-a-dish-shows-promise-1.9889 (in relation to Alzheimer’s
research).
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fording sufficient background, I will then turn to the DickeyWicker Amendment,46 the legislation underlying the action
brought in Sherley. After considering its prohibitions, I will put
forth a multi-part argument as to why Dickey-Wicker is inherently flawed.
A. THE CASE HISTORY OF SHERLEY V. SEBELIUS47
1. Sherley I
Sherley originated in U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia in August of 2009, when a group of plaintiffs, including Drs. James Sherley and Theresa Deisher, two scientists
who performed ASC research, sought to enjoin implementation
of new hESC research guidelines48 promulgated by the National Institutes of Health (NIH).49 Plaintiffs alleged, inter alia,
that by allowing the NIH to fund hESC research, they would
suffer irreparable harm because the new guidelines would increase competition for limited federal research funds, thereby
impeding their ability to compete for funding.50 The Government filed a motion to dismiss, on which the court looked favorably.51 Ruling that none of the plaintiffs had standing, the
court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.52
With regard to Drs. Sherley and Deisher, the court held that
standing was not present because, contrary to their allegations,
the so-called “competitor standing” doctrine53 was inapplica-

46. Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 128, 110
Stat. 26, 34 (1996).
47. For clarity, I designate each instantiation of Sherley with a Roman
numeral—e.g., Sherley I, Sherley II, and so forth.
48. Nat’l Inst. of Health, Guidelines for Human Stem Cell Research, 74
Fed. Reg. 32,170, 32,173 (July 7, 2009). These guidelines were the result of an
executive order from President Obama to remove President Bush’s limitations
on hESC research. See Removing Barriers to Responsible Scientific Research
Involving Human Stem Cells, Exec. Order No. 13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,667
(Mar. 11, 2009).
49. Sherley v. Sebelius (Sherley I), 686 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3–4 (D.D.C. 2009).
50. Id. at 4. But see O’Quinn, supra note 26, ¶ 37 (“In truth, the Guidelines . . . would have presented little threat to grant applications submitted by
Sherley because they had already been rejected through peer review.”).
51. Sherley I, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 5–7.
52. Id.
53. See Hardin v. Ky. Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 6 (1968) (“[W]hen the particular statutory provision [or regulation] invoked . . . reflect[s] a legislative purpose to protect a competitive interest, the injured competitor has stand-
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ble.54 Being that Drs. Sherley and Deisher were applicants for
research grants, as opposed to competitors in an economic market, the court found that an increase in competition for funding
does not equate to other applicants suffering harm.55
2. Sherley II
An appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit followed, challenging only the adjudication
that Drs. Sherley and Deisher lacked standing.56 The D.C. Circuit adopted a differing approach to the competitor standing
doctrine, disagreeing that it applied only to participants in a
strictly regulated economic market.57 The court found no difference in the applicability of the doctrine in the instance of competition for a governmental benefit, especially where the government has taken steps to benefit certain parties in opposition
to the economic interests of others vying for the same funding.58
Accordingly, Sherley was reversed and remanded back to the
District Court.59
3. Sherley III
The return of Sherley to the District Court proved to be
significant for stem cell research.60 Sherley III contains the first
substantial discussion of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment,61 a
rider to the Balanced Budget Downpayment Act of 1996, by the
courts.62 Although I will return to a more substantive discussion of Dickey-Wicker later, at this juncture it is advantageous
to briefly note its central prohibition. Dickey-Wicker provides,
in pertinent part, that “[n]one of the funds made available by
[the appropriation] may be used for . . . research in which a

ing . . . .”).
54. Sherley I, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 6.
55. Id. at 7.
56. Sherley v. Sebelius (Sherley II), 610 F.3d 69, 70 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
57. Id. at 72.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 75.
60. Sherley v. Sebelius (Sherley III), 704 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2010).
61. Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 128, 110
Stat. 26, 34 (1996).
62. Sherley III, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 67–73. Dickey-Wicker has been included in every appropriations bill for Health and Human Services since 1996 absent substantive change. See Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-8, § 509(a)(2), 123 Stat. 524, 803 (2009).
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human embryo or embryos are destroyed . . . .”63 Being that the
D.C. Circuit had found Drs. Sherley and Deisher to have standing, the District Court was now charged with evaluating
whether the grant of a preliminary injunction would be proper.64
In order to reach the merits of whether a preliminary injunction would be proper, the court had to ascertain if, as the
Government maintained, Dickey-Wicker is ambiguous.65 The
court focused on whether the use of ‘research’ in Dickey-Wicker
was ambiguous.66 The Government contended that, because ‘research’ is employed ambiguously in Dickey-Wicker, its interpretation should be granted Chevron67 deference.68 Chevron
deference occurs as a two-step process, whereby the court first
considers whether Congress has “directly spoken to the precise
question at issue,” and, if it has done so, then the court must
“give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”69 However, if the “statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue,” Congress would defer to the NIH’s
interpretation, assuming that it is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.”70
Owing to President Obama’s Executive Order removing
Bush-era limitations on federal funding of ESC research,71 the
NIH promulgated guidelines that speak to an interpretation of
‘research.’72 These guidelines allowed “funding of research using hESCs derived from human embryos created using [IVF]
for reproductive purposes and no longer needed for these pur-

63. Balanced Budget Downpayment Act § 128, 110 Stat. at 34.
64. Sherley III, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 65–66.
65. Id. at 70.
66. Id.
67. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984).
68. Sherley III, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 70.
69. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
70. Id.
71. Removing Barriers to Responsible Scientific Research Involving Human Stem Cells, Exec. Order No. 13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,667, 10,667 (Mar. 11,
2009) (“[The NIH] may support and conduct responsible, scientifically worthy
human stem cell research, including human embryonic stem cell research, to
the extent permitted by law.”).
72. Nat’l Inst. of Health, Guidelines for Human Stem Cell Research, 74
Fed. Reg. 32,170, 32,170 (July 7, 2009) (finalizing April 23, 2009 draft guidelines).
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poses.”73 Of particular relevance to Sherley, these guidelines
distinguished “between the derivation of stem cell from an embryo that results in the embryo’s destruction, for which federal
funding is prohibited, and research involving hESCs that does
not involve an embryo nor result in an embryo’s destruction, for
which federal funding is permitted.”74 The NIH conceived ‘research’ in a limited sense, arguing to the court that the language in Dickey-Wicker suggested an interpretation “of research as ‘a piece of research,’” which, it would follow,
buttresses such a distinction.75
The court, however, found no such ambiguity in DickeyWicker. The court read Dickey-Wicker as evincing the “unambiguous intent of Congress to enact a broad prohibition of funding research in which a human embryo is destroyed.”76 Such a
prohibition, the court reasoned, “encompasses all ‘research in
which’ an embryo is destroyed,” contrariwise to the NIH’s reading of the prohibition as applying only to a ‘piece of research’ in
which an embryo is destroyed.77 The court held that, absent
ambiguity, Congress had spoken directly to the issue, and this
necessitated under Chevron that it give effect to Congress’s intent.78 Accordingly, on August 23, 2010, Chief Judge Lamberth,
rather notoriously, granted the preliminary injunction, thereby
bringing all federal funding for hESC research to a halt.79 This
moratorium lasted just over two weeks, after an emergency appeal by the government resulted in the D.C. Circuit issuing an
administrative stay on September 9, 2010.80

73. Id. at 32,171.
74. Id. at 32,173.
75. Sherley III, 704 F. Supp. 2d 63, 70 (D.D.C. 2010).
76. Id. at 70–71.
77. Id. at 71 (emphasis in original).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 73 (“[I]t is in the public interest to enjoin defendants from implementing the Guidelines because the Guidelines allow federal funding of
ESC research, which involves the destruction of embryos.”). See O’Quinn, supra note 26, ¶ 23 (“Outcry and controversy in the aftermath of Chief Judge
Lamberth’s order was substantial and immediate.”). Of particular note, criticism from the legal academy argued that Chief Judge Lamberth’s grant of the
injunction was in error as a matter of law. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 23–31; Hank
Greely, Stem Cell Madness—Judge Lamberth’s Opinion and Order Enjoining
HESC Research, STANFORD L. & BIOSCIENCES BLOG (Aug. 31, 2010),
http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/lawandbiosciences/2010/08/31/stem-cell-madnessjudge-lamberths-opinion-and-order-enjoining-hesc-research/.
80. Sherley v. Sebelius, Civ. A. No. 10-5287 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 9, 2010) (order
granting administrative stay).
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4. Sherley IV
In Sherley IV, the D.C. Circuit now had to decide whether
the preliminary injunction issued by Judge Lamberth was
proper.81 Notably, Sherley IV contains the first instance in
which a court recognized the curious timing of the passage of
Dickey-Wicker, a point to which I will later return.82 Specifically, the D.C. Circuit noted that the “historical record suggests
the Congress passed [Dickey-Wicker] chiefly to preclude President Clinton from acting upon an NIH report recommending
federal funding for research using embryos that had been created for the purpose of in vitro fertilization.”83 As the court
rightly concluded, Dickey-Wicker would only become relevant
to hESCs two years later, with the derivation of the first stable
hESC line in 1998.84
As to the merits in Sherley IV, the court disagreed with
Chief Judge Lamberth’s interpretation of the language in Dickey-Wicker as evincing, in accord with Drs. Sherley and Deisher’s position, a broad reading of ‘research.’85 Instead, the court
reasoned that the “definition of research is flexible enough to
describe either a discrete project or an extended process, but
this flexibility only reinforces our conclusion that the text is
ambiguous.”86 The first step of Chevron, accordingly, was in favor of the NIH.87 With respect to step two of Chevron, the court
again sided with the NIH, concluding that its interpretation of
Dickey-Wicker was reasonable “[b]ecause the Congress wrote
with particularity and in the present tense—the statute says
‘in which’ and ‘are’ rather than ‘for which’ and ‘were.’”88 Consequently, the court vacated the preliminary injunction.89
Judge Henderson dissented from the decision, advancing a
position in accord with Chief Judge Lamberth, which would
stop at step one in the Chevron analysis of Dickey-Wicker.90
Judge Henderson’s reasoning warrants close scrutiny because
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Sherley v. Sebelius (Sherley IV), 644 F.3d 388, 392 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
See infra Part II.B.2.
Sherley IV, 644 F.3d at 390.
Id. at 391.
Id. at 394.
Id.
See id. (dismissing arguments to the contrary of the NIH position).
Id. at 396.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 399–400 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
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it highlights critical worries as to how various courts have examined the fundamental issue in Sherley, namely, how should
the language of Dickey-Wicker be interpreted?91 Judge Henderson focused on the timing of Dickey-Wicker—enacted two years
prior to the derivation of the first stable hESC line—as indicative of a broad reading of ‘research.’92 Judge Henderson reasoned that “[t]he Congress, recognizing its scant knowledge
about the feasibility/scope of hESC research, chose broad language with the plain intent to make the ban as complete as
possible.”93 Furthermore, she argued that the majority had
“strain[ed] mightily” to find the requisite ambiguity in the
wording of Dickey-Wicker to proceed past step one of Chevron.94
Judge Henderson, moreover, rightly points out the flawed
reliance of the majority on the bare fact that Congress has enacted Dickey-Wicker unchanged every year since 1996.95 The
judge explained that “[w]here the law is plain,” Congressional
reenactment “does not constitute an adoption of a previous administrative construction.”96 Much as is the case with the majority’s analysis of this issue, her reasoning is incomplete. This
issue is governed by the reenactment-acquiescence doctrine,
first recognized in National Lead Company v. United States,
under which subsequent reenactments “amount[] to an implied
legislative recognition and approval of the executive construction of the statute” because “Congress is presumed to have legislated with knowledge of such an established usage of an executive department of the government.”97 The majority in Sherley
cited an instantiation of this principle from Barnhart v. Walton
as support for the adoption of NIH’s interpretation of DickeyWicker.98
As Judge Henderson adduces in her dissent, this doctrine
is questionably applied by the majority, due to the plain mean-

91. See id. at 399 (“The majority opinion has taken a straightforward case
of statutory construction and produced a result that would make Rube Goldberg tip his hat.”).
92. See id. at 401.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 402.
95. Id. at 404.
96. Id. (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 121 (1994)).
97. Nat’l Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 146 (1920) (internal citations omitted).
98. Sherley IV, 644 F.3d at 396 (citing Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212,
220 (2002)).
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ing of the language in Dickey-Wicker.99 Yet Judge Henderson
commits the same mistake as the majority, namely, “misappl[lying] precedent by not searching for an affirmative congressional intent to acquiesce.”100 Barnhart employed legislative history in its determination of the nature of the
congressional intent to which the doctrine would acquiesce.101
Both the majority in Sherley IV and Judge Henderson in her
dissent fail to further investigate precisely the nature of the
congressional intent behind Dickey-Wicker.102 In this sense, the
court has uncritically assumed the applicability of the doctrine
without carrying out the full implications of the precedents upon which it relies.103 Moreover, this deficiency is particularly
troublesome because of Dickey-Wicker’s status as a rider
amendment, where “shortcomings in the congressional procedures used to enact [policy riders render them] especially indeterminate expressions of congressional intent.”104
5. Sherley V
With the preliminary injunction vacated, Sherley was once
again before Chief Judge Lamberth in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia.105 The parties sought a ruling on
cross-motions for summary judgment, and largely rehashed
previous arguments while differing as to their opinions of the
effect of the D.C. Circuit’s decision vacating the preliminary injunction.106 Chief Judge Lamberth’s opinion is comprehensive,
yet at its core it is an unmistakably reluctant acquiescence to
the D.C. Circuit’s prior decision. As Chief Judge Lamberth
states: “While it may be true that by following the Court of Appeals’ conclusion as to the ambiguity of ‘research,’ this Court
has become a grudging partner in a bout of ‘linguistic jujitsu’
[quoting Sherley IV], such is life for an antepenultimate
99. Id. at 404 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
100. Recent Cases, Civil Law—Federal Funding of Human Embryonic
Stem Cell Research—D.C. Circuit Vacates District Court’s Preliminary Injunction of Federal Funding for Research Using Human Embryonic Stem Cells.—
Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388 (D.C. Cir. 2011), 125 Harv. L. Rev. 626, 629
(2011).
101. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 220 (2002).
102. Recent Cases, supra note 100, at 629–31.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 629, 631.
105. Sherley v. Sebelius (Sherley V), 776 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2011).
106. See id. at 4, 10–11.
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court.”107
Ultimately, Drs. Sherley and Deisher failed to offer any
new information or reasoning that would give Chief Judge
Lamberth cause to depart from the D.C. Circuit’s holding in regards to the meaning of “research” in Dickey-Wicker.108
6. Sherley VI and Future Concerns
Chief Judge Lamberth’s decision was appealed109 and oral
arguments were heard on April 23, 2012.110 On August 24,
2012, the court issued a ruling in favor of the NIH and a petition for a writ of certiorari has been filed in the U.S. Supreme
Court.111 For the moment, federal funding for hESC may continue.112 Of particular note in the decision, Judge Brown offers
this concluding reflection in her concurrence, which serves to
frame many of the issues that I wish to raise with DickeyWicker: “Given the weighty interests at stake in this encounter
between science and ethics, relying on an increasingly Delphic,
decade-old single paragraph rider on an appropriations bill
hardly seems adequate.”113
Regardless of whether Sherley receives its final word in the
D.C. Circuit or the U.S. Supreme Court, the larger issue that
Sherley’s tortured march through the courts underscores is the
extent to which it is appropriate for courts to impact how the
research community functions.114 This is a thorny issue, but

107. Id. at 15 (quoting Sherley IV, 644 F.3d 388, 398–99 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(Henderson, J., dissenting)).
108. Id.
109. Sherley v. Sebelius (Sherley VI), 689 F.3d 776, 776 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
110. Meredith Wadman, Stem-cell Arguments Heard in US Appeals Court,
NATURE NEWS BLOG (April 23, 2012), http://blogs.nature.com/news/2012/04/
stem-cell-arguments-heard-in-us-appeals-court.html.
111. Sherley v. Sebelius (Sherley VI), 689 F.3d 776, 776 (D.C. Cir. 2012),
petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Oct. 10, 2012) (No. 12-454).
112. But see Cohen et al., Sherley v Sebelius and the Future of Stem Cell
Research, 308 JAMA 2087, 2087 (2012) (“It is uncertain whether the legal discord over the federal funding of hESC research is over. The plaintiffs have
sought review of the case by the US Supreme Court, a prospect contingent on
the votes of 4 justices. If the Supreme Court should grant review of the case,
the federal funding of hESC research would, once again, be placed in legal
limbo. Moreover, a decision overruling the Court of Appeals would bar any future administration from funding hESC research.”).
113. Sherley VI, 689 F.3d at 790.
114. See O’Quinn, supra note 26, ¶ 33 (“Perhaps the only outcome worse
than a judgment against the NIH Guidelines altogether is exactly what has
transpired—placing the scientific community in a chaotic state of limbo.”).
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one of increasing import as the prevalence of biotechnologies
continues to grow.115
O’Quinn argues that the judiciary should not play any role
in arbitrating funding issues, leaving such determinations to
already-existing mechanisms in the research community, such
as Internal Review Boards and the peer review process.116 Although his posited solution would suit the research community’s
objectives well, it neglects to account for the role of the judiciary in a case like Sherley, where the court is asked to evaluate
whether, given the nature of the underlying law, to grant a preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary remedy” necessitating that a high burden be carried by
the moving party; a fact of which courts, including those that
reviewed Sherley, are well aware.117 In short, a preliminary injunction is not granted lightly. While it is worrisome that, as in
Sherley, the grant of a preliminary injunction can have a staggering effect on an entire research community, spotlighting the
nature of a preliminary injunction in the case of stem cell research misses the more salient issue. As I will turn to in the
subsequent section, the root worry rests with the law upon
which the courts had to base their decision: the Dickey-Wicker
Amendment.
B. THE FLAWS OF THE DICKEY-WICKER AMENDMENT
I will now consider Dickey-Wicker in more detail, offering
criticism in the sub-sections to follow. As a rider, DickeyWicker occupied scant space in the Balanced Budget Downpayment Act of 1996.118 Dickey-Wicker provided that:
(a) None of the funds made available in this Act may be used for—
(1) the creation of a human embryo or embryos

115. Cf. Cummings, supra note 24, at 77–78 (detailing the significance of
stem cell research in developing progressive new treatments for many medical
conditions); Fujikawa, supra note 32, at 1079 (“Stem cells command attention
in the national debate because of their immense potential for advancing medical treatment.”).
116. See O’Quinn, supra note 26, ¶¶ 35–39.
117. See, e.g., Sherley v. Sebelius (Sherley IV), 644 F.3d 388, 392 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22
(2008)); Sherley v. Sebelius (Sherley III), 704 F. Supp. 2d 63, 69 (D.D.C. 2010)
(quoting Cobell v. Norton, 391 F.3d 251, 258 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
118. The amendment consists of thirteen lines of text within this twentythree-page law. See Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, Pub. L. No. 104-99, §
128, 110 Stat. 26, 34 (1996).
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for research purposes; or
(2) research in which a human embryo or embryos are
destroyed, discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk of
injury or death greater than that allowed for research
on fetuses in utero under 45 CFR 46.204(b) and section
498(b) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C.
289g(b)).
(b) For purposes of this section, the term ‘‘human embryo or embryos’’
includes any organism, not protected as a human subject under 45
CFR 46 as of the date of the enactment of this Act, that is derived by
fertilization, parthenogenesis, cloning, or any other means from one
or more human gametes or human diploid cells.119

The prohibition in section (a)(1) has received uniform interpretation by three presidential administrations,120 beginning
with the Clinton Administration, which prohibited federal
funding for research in which human embryos are created expressly for research purposes only.121 Although section (a)(2)
seems straightforward enough, the case history of Sherley
demonstrates that interpretations of “research” as used therein
vary widely.
1. Appropriations Riders and Stem Cell Legislation
Apart from concern for the meaning of ‘research’ in section
(a)(2), which occupied the court in Sherley, the first cause for
worry about Dickey-Wicker stems from its status as an appropriations rider. One of the few scholars to examine prima facie
worries over the use of appropriations riders as means of affecting substantive policies,122 Neal Devins strongly argues that
appropriations riders are not conducive to developing sound
policies, and claims that they skirt House and Senate rules
aimed at ensuring deliberate and systematic policymaking decisions.123 Moreover, he notes that the use of the appropriations
119. Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, § 509, 123 Stat.
524, 803 (2009).
120. See, e.g., Address to the Nation on Stem Cell Research, 2 PUB. PAPERS
953–56 (Aug. 9, 2001) (calling the practice of creating embryos solely for research “deeply troubling”); Nat’l Inst. Of Health, Guidelines for Human Stem
Cell Research, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,170, 32,174 (July 7, 2009) (NIH Guidelines issued under the Obama Administration containing requirements to ensure embryos were not produced exclusively for research).
121. See Fujikawa, supra note 32, at 1082.
122. See id. at 1083 (describing the operation of the Dickey Amendment as
a rider restricting federal funding).
123. Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders, 1987 DUKE L.J. 456, 457–58. Cf. Cummings, supra note 24, at 83
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process to accomplish substantive objectives precludes application of appropriate committee expertise in crafting the legislation.124 As importantly, Devins likewise cites resultant difficulties for other branches of the federal government, such as the
judiciary, who are charged with interpreting these riders.125
Applying these concerns to Dickey-Wicker, the problem
with using an appropriations rider to govern federal funding for
hESC research requires little explanation. Owing to the complexity of the issues operative in hESC research, leaving the
determination of federal funding to committees with suitable
expertise would be more appropriate. Similarly, allowing these
federal funding policies to develop under deliberate and systematic congressional committee review would afford the surest
means by which to avoid resultant interpretive difficulties in
other branches of the federal government. As Sherley demonstrates, the materialization of such interpretive difficulties is a
very real phenomenon, not just in the judiciary, but likewise in
the Executive Branch.126
In light of these difficulties, coupled with the therapeutic
significance of hESC research efforts, Layla Cummings argues
that comprehensive stem cell research legislation should be
passed, in order to make Congress’s intentions in this area
transparent.127 For Cummings, such legislation would “preferably . . . codify President Obama’s executive order and open the
door to a transparent set of rules that will regulate future
hESC research.”128 She goes on to note that just such a bill, the
Stem Cell Research Advancement Act, was introduced in the
(noting that appropriations riders do not pass through the same congressional
review process as do other substantive pieces of legislation aimed at directly
banning agency action).
124. Devins, supra note 123, at 458.
125. See id. (“Because most appropriations are restricted to a specific time
period . . . the purposes for which they are enacted may vary with changed circumstances. . . . On the other hand, Congress may reenact a rider several
times to establish its view as to how an authorizations statute should be interpreted. Court interpretations of limitation riders as amendments to previously enacted legislation, therefore, are inherently unreliable; they may be accurate one day, inaccurate the next, and irrelevant at the end of the fiscal
year.”).
126. The Executive Branch, through the NIH, consistently argued that the
language of the Dickey Amendment was ambiguous in the Sherley cases. See
supra Part II.A.
127. Cummings, supra note 24, at 93–95.
128. Id. at 93.

DIAMOND_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

2/11/2013 10:46 AM

THE FLAWS OF STEM CELL LEGISLATION

279

House of Representatives in 2009 and, in 2010, a companion
bill bearing the same title was introduced in the Senate.129 A
similar bill was once again proposed in the House of Representatives in 2011.130
Passing such a bill has proven difficult but, if successful,
would theoretically alleviate many of the worries associated
with having a rider control the issue.131 The position taken by
Cummings, which advocates for such legislation to adopt a particular stance,132 misses the fundamental purpose of passing
comprehensive stem cell legislation. Rather, the rationale for
such legislation is to imbue an otherwise muddled issue with
much needed clarity, a purpose that would be served regardless
of the particular nature of the policies. This is, admittedly, a
difficult point to conceive. However, read in light of later discussion in this paper on future policy challenges posed by iPSCs demonstrating that current policies are poorly equipped to
address the changing science, it will become clear that the prima facie challenge for stem cell policies is not to sort out which
stance is more advisable than others; rather, the challenge is to
satisfy the bare requirement of accounting for the very science
they seek to regulate.
2. Chronological Worries
The second cause for worry in Dickey-Wicker derives from
the timing of its drafting and promulgation. Presently, regulatory and normative issues in hESC research are reasonably
well defined.133 During the period in which Dickey-Wicker
arose, however, this was far from the case.134 This fact can be
witnessed in two regards. The promulgation of Dickey-Wicker
occurred during a period in which biotechnological concerns

129. Id.
130. Stem Cell Research Advancement Act, H.R. 2376, 112th Cong. § 1
(2011).
131. A check of the THOMAS database indicates that none of the proposed
legislation has made it out of committee for consideration by the full Senate or
House. See, e.g., Bill Summary and Status—H.R.2376, 112th Congress,
(use
LIBR.CONGRESS—THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/Thomas.php
search function for H.R. 2376).
132. Cummings, supra note 24, at 93.
133. See, e.g., Shannon McGuire, Embryonic Stem Cells: Marrow of the
Dickey Matter, 11 J. HIGH TECH L. 160, 175 (2010) (describing the roles of the
FDA and NIH in regulating hESC research).
134. See id. at 177 (explaining that at the time of Dickey-Wicker, “the concept of therapeutic stem cell research had not yet been developed”).
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were focused on cloning, IVF, and somatic cell nuclear transfer
(SCNT).135 These concerns derived largely from worries that resurfaced following the successful cloning of the first mammal,
Dolly, a sheep, at the University of Edinburgh in 1996.136 As
Jonathan Moreno notes: “[s]ince cloning is one way to obtain
embryonic stem cells . . . the first tidal wave of publicity about
cloning and Dolly merged into the second about embryonic stem
cells.”137 The scientific backdrop at the time, therefore, had little, if any, concerted focus on emerging issues in stem cell research.
Curiously, because Dickey-Wicker originated in 1995, it
predates the discovery of the science it regulates.138 As mentioned above, the derivation of the first human embryonic stem
cell line would not come until 1998. In this sense, the “authors
[of Dickey-Wicker] . . . could not have foreseen the dawn of human ESC research.”139 Moreno likewise cites this chronological
anomaly, stating that when Dickey-Wicker was passed, “no one
anticipated the question that would be raised by the creation of
human embryonic stem cells only three years later[;] [n]amely,
could the NIH fund studies of cells that came from . . . leftover
embryos?”140 Particularly in the instance of a rapidly changing
science like hESC research, it makes little sense to allow Dickey-Wicker to speak to the issue of federal funding when its origins predate the very science it regulates.141
3. Ambiguous Language
The third cause for worry turns on the varied interpretations of what precisely Dickey-Wicker prohibits. This fact is
amply witnessed in the case history of Sherley. Following the

135. Id. at 177.
136. JONATHAN D. MORENO, THE BODY POLITIC: THE BATTLE OVER
SCIENCE IN AMERICA 104–05 (2011).
137. Id. at 107.
138. Stem cells were successfully isolated in 1998, two years after the
Dickey Amendment’s passage. McGuire, supra note 133, at 177.
139. I. Glenn Cohen & Eli Y. Adashi, Human Embryonic Stem-Cell Research under Siege—Battle Won but Not the War, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED.
e48(1), e48(1) (2011), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/
NEJMp1105088.
140. MORENO, supra note 136, at 104.
141. McGuire, supra note 133, at 177 (“To apply a regulatory law that was
enacted before the research protocol was even discovered is not practical nor is
it favorable for scientific research and advancement.”).
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derivation of the first stable hESC lines in 1998, early proponents of hESC research argued that the purview of DickeyWicker did not apply to these new discoveries insofar as federal
funds were not used to create these cell lines.142 In order to ensure compliance with Dickey-Wicker, Harold Varmus, thenchair of the NIH, sought the guidance of Harriet Rabb, thenGeneral Counsel for the Department of Health and Human
Services, as to the new hESC discovery.143 Rabb asserted that
federal funds could not be used to harvest hESCs from an embryo, but they could be used to support subsequent research on
those cells.144 Rabb based this opinion on her view that the
statutory definition of “human embryo” did not include hESCs
because hESCs are not organisms that, when implanted in the
uterus, are capable of becoming a human being.145 In accord
with Rabb’s opinion, the NIH released guidelines that permitted federal funding for research on stem cells that were derived
from human embryos using private funds.146
Change came swiftly, however, after George W. Bush took
office in 2001. President Bush put forth a new stem cell research policy, restricting federal funding to existing stem cell
lines.147 This policy superceded the previous NIH guidelines as
of November 2001.148 The Bush policy was repealed in 2009, at
the request of President Obama, by the promulgation of updated NIH guidelines.149 Amidst all of these changes, Rabb’s opinion remained the prevailing governmental interpretation of
Dickey-Wicker.150 However, as the procedural history of Sherley
demonstrates, this interpretation has been incisively challenged, with judicial interpretations varying between different
federal courts in the District of Columbia. This history in toto
evinces a lack of clarity as to the precise scope and nature of
the prohibitions in Dickey-Wicker.

142. Hughes, et al., supra note 42, at 407.
143. Fujikawa, supra note 32, at 1085–86.
144. Id. at 1086.
145. Cohen & Adashi, supra note 139, at e48(1).
146. Nat’l Insts. of Health Guidelines for Research Using Human Pluripotent Stem Cells, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,976, 51,979 (Aug. 25, 2000).
147. Address to the Nation on Stem Cell Research, supra note 120, at 955.
148. Nat’l Insts. of Health Guidelines for Research Using Human Pluripotent Stem Cells, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,107 (Nov. 14, 2001).
149. Nat’l Insts. of Health Guidelines for Human Stem Cell Research, 74
Fed. Reg. 32,170 (2009).
150. Cohen & Adashi, supra note 139, at e48(1).
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C. DICKEY-WICKER AND THE MORAL DEBATE
The moral debate surrounding stem cell research confounds efforts to imbue Dickey-Wicker, and stem cell policy in
general, with clarity. In the political realm, President Bush
brought the moral debate to the fore in 2001, just prior to his
significant changes to Clinton-era stem cell research policy.151
In an evening address to the nation, President Bush expressed
that hESC research “raises profound ethical questions” because
the derivation of hESCs necessitates the destruction of the embryo, thereby “destroy[ing] its potential for life.”152 This conservative moral stance on stem cell research was reflected in
his changes to the Clinton-era policy; specifically, by allowing
federal funding for hESCs only for stem cells derived from embryos that had already been destroyed and where, in his words,
“the life and death decision ha[d] already been made.”153 President Bush had waded into a thorny philosopher’s debate, the
contours of which would not start to become well defined until a
few years later.154
In lifting Bush-era stem cell research restrictions, President Obama employed none of the moral language or reasoning
of his predecessor. The purpose of lifting Bush-era restrictions,
President Obama stated, was “to enhance the contribution of
America’s scientists to important new discoveries and new
therapies for the benefit of humankind.”155 Other language in
151. But see Hughes et al., supra note 42, at 411, 413–15 (arguing that the
“normative debate storm clouds over stem cell research” first appeared in the
context of President Clinton’s reaction to the announcement in 1997 of the
first mammal—Dolly, the sheep—produced through SCNT).
152. Address to the Nation on Stem Cell Research, supra note 120, at 956.
153. Id. at 955.
154. The debate over the moral status of the human embryo, which bears
on the determination of what is considered permissible research on such an
embryo, is a rich dialogue well beyond the scope of this article. Compare
GEORGE & TOLLEFSEN, supra note 35, at 202 (claiming that human embryos
are human beings with personhood rights), with Michael J. Sandel, Embryo
Ethics: The Moral Logic of Stem-Cell Research, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 207, 208
(2004) (challenging the concept that embryos have the same rights as persons),
Paul R. McHugh, Zygote and ‘Clonote’: The Ethical Use of Embryonic Stem
Cells, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 209, 210 (2004) (arguing that IVF should strictly
be used to produce viable infants, while SCNT should be used only to produce
biological matter), and Gene H. Outka, The Ethics of Human Stem Cell Research, 12 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 175, 206–207 (2002) (proposing that research on excess embryos not created for research is permissible).
155. Removing Barriers to Responsible Scientific Research Involving Human Stem Cells, Exec. Order No. 13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,667 (Mar. 11, 2009).
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his Executive Order emphasized that the hESC research must
be “responsible” and “scientifically worthy.”156 Subsequent NIH
draft guidelines, promulgated to implement the changes ordered by President Obama, echoed this language, adding that
such research must be “ethically responsible.”157 This language,
which feels almost boilerplate, is distinct from the moral tenor
of hESC research opinions expressed by President Bush. In
fact, within the academic debate over the moral status of the
human embryo, concerted efforts have been made to structure
the arguments around what science reveals about the early development of the human embryo.158
In view of the history of the debate over federal funding of
stem cell research, it is likely that moral worries will remain a
part of the dialogue. Allowing moral discourse to permeate the
dialogue is not in itself problematic. In fact, bioethics has much
to offer public policy, not least in facilitating efforts to sort the
oft-uncertain implications of new scientific developments. However, the extent to which moral worries control stem cell policy
development needs to be constrained. In accord with President
Obama’s approach to hESC research funding, effort should be
made to curtail the prior impact of normative concerns on the
development of new research funding policy. Dickey-Wicker, to
be sure, does not offer the best means by which to accomplish
such an agenda, owing to the fact that it originally arose in relation to concerns disparate from those that hESCs underscore.159 Therefore, even if one wanted hESC research policy to
reflect a particular moral stance, Dickey-Wicker would be poorly equipped to fulfill this role.
More crucially, I want to suggest that, owing to the discordant viewpoints that bear on the moral debate over the status of the human embryo, we should be hesitant to root the
funding debate in normative matters at all. For those sympa-

156. Id.
157. Draft Nat’l Inst. of Health Guidelines for Human Stem Cell Research
Notice, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,578 (proposed Apr. 23, 2009).
158. See, e.g., GEORGE & TOLLEFSEN, supra note 35, at 27–56. William
Saletan, who engaged in a fruitful debate with George and Tollefsen in a series of articles, has noted the difficulties of couching the debate in science, particularly for those who, like George and Tollefsen, take a conservative stance
on the status of the human embryo. See William Saletan, Little Children, N.Y.
TIMES BOOK REV., Feb. 10, 2008, at 24 (“[George and Tollefsen’s] argument is
brave but risky. Shifting the pro-life case from religion to science puts it at the
mercy of scientific discovery, with all the attendant surprises.”).
159. See supra Part II.B.2.
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thetic to Rawlsian political liberalism, this is likely a palatable
claim. For John Rawls, it is reasonable for people in modern
democratic societies to disagree about moral questions.160 As he
states: “[I]t is not to be expected that conscientious persons
with full powers of reason, even after free discussion, will all
arrive at the same conclusion.”161 In view of this, Rawls argues
that, when debating justice, we should argue from a “political
conception of the person,” which stands apart from our own
moral convictions.162
Rawlsian moral neutrality finds kinship, to some degree, in
Habermas. To be sure, Habermas and Rawls disagree on many
things in the domain of political philosophy, yet their shared
conception in this regard is striking. Habermas asserts that
Rawls draws the proper conclusion: that the “just society” ought to
leave it to individuals to choose how it is that they want to “spend the
time they have for living.” It guarantees to each an equal freedom to
develop an ethical self-understanding, so as to realize a personal conception of the “good life” according to one’s own abilities and choices.163

If we are to take seriously the relevance of moral neutrality
as applied to the funding debate—and I contend that we
should—then it has salient ramifications for the design of policies like Dickey-Wicker.
Arguing against moral neutrality in Rawls and Habermas,
Michael Sandel asserts that, in the instance of stem cell research, “the case for permitting embryonic stem cell research
cannot be made without taking a stand on the moral and religious controversy about when personhood begins.”164 According
to Sandel, the argument for permitting hESC research “presupposes an answer to that controversy—namely that the preimplantation embryo destroyed in the course of embryonic stem
cell research is not yet a human being.”165 If Sandel is right,
then my appeal to moral neutrality in political liberalism is
mistaken.
In point of fact, I agree with Sandel’s argument. In prom-

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
(2009).
165.

JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 58 (expanded ed. 1993).
Id.
Id. at 29–31.
HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 2.
MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? 252
Id. at 252–53.
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ulgating a policy allowing a science that is inextricably bound
up with a moral issue, we necessarily adopt the moral stance
reflected in the particular side of the debate on which the policy
falls. So far as I can tell, this is not a contentious point. In fact,
Sandel rightly acknowledges that hESC research is perhaps a
“special case,”166 which is to say that his point cannot likely be
generalized to other parts of the law. The purview of Sandel’s
argument, however, differs critically from mine. My assertion
concerns the funding debate, whereas his point speaks to the
foundational issue of whether hESC research is to be permitted
in the first place.167 My argument properly distinguishes between this foundational issue, on which I would agree with
Sandel, and the funding debate.
Dickey-Wicker, with which my contention is concerned,
controls the funding debate, not the issue of whether hESC research should be allowed. I appeal to moral neutrality in the
context of the funding debate because any discussion of whether hESC is morally permissible has no place in a debate concerned only with whether federal funding should or should not
be allocated. In general, the contours of the hESC debate have
been poorly defined, which results in the conflation of two distinct issues: whether hESC research should be allowed in the
first place; and, granting that it should, whether it should receive federal funding. I do not suggest that we abandon all discussion of whether the federal government should or should not
fund a morally controversial science. This critical issue, which
has received little attention, is not the province of this article.
The history of Dickey-Wicker reveals that, when we argue
over whether hESC should receive federal funding, we are more
often than not actually arguing over whether hESC should be
allowed at all.168 That these separate issues have been conflated in debating the merits of Dickey-Wicker is telling, not merely in the sense that it further demonstrates the weaknesses of
Dickey-Wicker, but also in the sense that it highlights how
poorly the contours of the stem cell debate are understood in
the political realm. Dickey-Wicker, ultimately, seeks to do indirectly what cannot be done directly. That is to say, if moral sentiment dictates that hESC is wrong, and an outright prohibi-

166. Id. at 253.
167. See id. at 252–53.
168. See, e.g., id. (claiming that the “legal question” of whether to allow
such research hinges on the underlying moral dilemma).
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tion is not viable, cutting off federal funding constituting nearly
all funding for hESC research is the next best alternative. The
perils of this approach should be quite clear by now. To take seriously our ethic of healing, our policies must, at bottom, exhibit sufficient awareness of the issues at stake.
IV. BRÜSTLE V. GREENPEACE AND THE FLAWS OF
STEM CELL PATENT REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION
In this section, I first consider the history of Brüstle v.
Greenpeace.169 I then afford careful attention to its tripartite
holding,170 after which I consider the potential ramifications of
the decision for biotechnological patents and stem cell research
in the EU. This discussion will motivate an analysis of Directive 98/44/EC on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, the underlying piece of legislation in Brüstle.171 I will
argue that the Directive exhibits certain flaws, some of which
are akin to those in Dickey-Wicker, whereas others are unique
to the Directive and its purported aim to unify biotechnological
patents across EU Member States.
A. A HISTORY OF BRÜSTLE
Oliver Brüstle, Director of the Institute of Reconstructive
Neurobiology at the University of Bonn, held a German patent,
filed in 1997, relating to isolated and purified neural precursor
cells, processes for their production from hESCs, and the subsequent use of neural precursor cells for the treatment of neural defects.172 Brüstle alleged that the transplantation of brain
cells into the nervous system held the promise of treating many
neurological diseases, including Parkinson’s, for which the first
clinical applications had been developed.173 The process, however, required the transplantation of immature precursor cells
from the human embryo, which accounted for the “significant

169. Case C-34/10, Brüstle v. Greenpeace e.V., 2011 EUR-Lex CELEX
LEXIS 2599 (Oct. 18, 2011).
170. See id. ¶ 53.
171. Directive 98/44, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6
July 1998 on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, 1998 O.J. (L
213) 1, 13 (EC) [hereinafter Directive].
172. Brüstle, 2011 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 2599, ¶ 15.
173. Id. ¶16.
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ethical questions” it raised.174 The activist group Greenpeace
challenged Brüstle’s patent in the Bundespatentgericht, Germany’s Federal Patent Court, which ruled that the patent was
invalid.175
Brüstle appealed the ruling to the Bundesgerichtshof,
Germany’s Federal Court of Justice, which referred the case to
the ECJ for guidance on three issues.176 First, the Bundesgerichtshof requested guidance as to the meaning of “human
embryos” in Article 6(2)(c) of the Directive.177 Second, the Bundesgerichtshof requested guidance as to the expression “uses of
human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes” in the
same section, and specifically asked whether it also covers the
use of human embryos for purposes of scientific research.178
Third, the Bundesgerichtshof requested guidance as to whether
a patent that does not directly claim use of human embryos,
but either relies on a product whose production necessitates the
prior destruction of human embryos or concerns a process for
which such a product is needed as base material, is unpatentable.179 I consider each of these referred questions in succession
below.
1. The First Referred Question
With regards to the first question, the ECJ announced a
basic principle in EU law that, where no express reference is
made to the law of a particular, member state for the purpose
of determining its meaning and scope, it must be given an “independent and uniform interpretation” throughout the EU.180
Accordingly, the ECJ reasoned that, because the Directive neither defines ‘human embryo’ nor makes explicit reference to national laws that might elucidate such a definition, it must designate an “autonomous concept” of EU law with uniform
interpretation across member states.181 This conclusion, the

174. Id. ¶17–18.
175. Id. ¶ 19.
176. Id. ¶¶ 19, 23.
177. Id. ¶ 23; see also Directive, supra note 171, at 18 art. 6(2)(c) (“[T]he
following, in particular, shall be considered unpatentable: . . . (c) uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes.”).
178. Case C-34/10, Brüstle v. Greenpeace e.V., 2011 EUR-Lex CELEX
LEXIS 2599 (Oct. 18, 2011).
179. Id.
180. Id. ¶ 25.
181. Id. ¶ 26.
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ECJ notes, is in accord with the preamble to the Directive,
which expresses the intent to harmonize legislation in this area
in an effort to encourage trade and industrial research amongst
member states.182
This reasoning is obvious enough, yet it has troubling implications. Oddly, the ECJ speculates that, but for a uniform
definition, researchers would be tempted to seek patents in
those member states that have narrow conceptions of human
dignity and, therefore, would be the most liberal in terms of patentability.183 Hence, the ECJ seems to acknowledge that different definitions of human dignity exist amongst member
states. However, it prioritizes the need for uniformity over
these possible differences, based on reference to, inter alia, the
intent behind the Directive as explicated in the preamble.184
The ECJ supports this prioritization by noting that it is “not
called upon . . . to broach questions of a medical or ethical nature, but must restrict itself to a legal interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Directive” because the “definition of
human embryo is a very sensitive social issue in many Member
States, marked by their multiple traditions and value systems.”185 In terms of legal reasoning, this conclusion is not objectionable. However, a point to which I will later return, the
fact that the Directive supports this prioritization is worrisome
on a policymaking level.186
Having announced the need for an “autonomous concept,”187 the ECJ noted that, where definition of a specific term
is absent, consideration of its possible meaning must look to the
context in which it is employed.188 In view of this consideration,
the ECJ concluded that the context and aim of the Directive
evinces the legislative intent “to exclude any possibility of patentability where respect for human dignity could thereby be

182. Id. at ¶ 27; see also Directive, supra note 171, at 13 pmbl. 3 (“Whereas
effective and harmonised protection throughout the Member States is essential in order to maintain and encourage investment in the field of biotechnology . . . .”).
183. Brüstle, 2011 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 2599, ¶ 28.
184. Directive, supra note 171, at 13 pmbl. 3.
185. Brüstle, 2011 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 2599, ¶ 30.
186. See infra Part IV.B.2.
187. Brüstle, 2011 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 2599, ¶ 26.
188. See id. ¶ 31.
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affected.”189 Accordingly, ‘human embryo’ “must be understood
in a wide sense.”190 Adopting a broad construal, therefore, the
ECJ held that ‘human embryo’ includes “any human ovum after
fertilisation, any non-fertilised human ovum into which the cell
nucleus from a mature human cell has been transplanted and
any non-fertilised human ovum whose division and further development have been stimulated by parthenogenesis.”191
The ECJ left the issue of whether, in light of its recommendations, a stem cell obtained from a human embryo at the
blastocyst stage constitutes a ‘human embryo’ under the Directive for the Bundesgerichtshof to determine.192 Nickas argues that the ECJ’s decision not to reach a conclusion on this
issue undermines efforts to afford ‘human embryo’ a uniform
meaning across the EU.193 Particularly, “by sidestepping the
issue, [the ECJ] has impeded, rather than promoted, harmonization of EU patent laws.”194 In fact, as the argument goes, the
referral is a foregone conclusion because isolation of stem cells
from human blastocysts necessitates destruction of the embryos, which the ECJ has already stated are excluded from patentability.195 This argument, however, seems to assuage its
own worries. While the ECJ seems to have undercut its efforts
towards uniformity with the referral, the very nature of its
guidance provides the obvious conclusion to the referred question. In this sense, it does provide the desired uniformity, albeit
in an indirect manner. Crucially, the force of Brüstle is that the
scope of its patentability prohibition answers all questions
raised by science where an embryo is destroyed.
2. The Second Referred Question
The ECJ noted that the Directive is intended to regulate

189. Id. ¶ 34.
190. Id.
191. Id. ¶¶ 37–38. As to the latter two inclusions, the ECJ noted that, even
though these organisms have not been the object of fertilization, the effect of
the technique used to obtain them indicates that they are capable of beginning
the process of development of a “human being” in the same manner as an embryo created by fertilization. Id. at ¶ 36.
192. Id. ¶¶ 37–38.
193. Mark Nickas, Discordant Harmonization: Did the European Court of
Justice Interpret the Biotechnology Directive’s Exclusions to Patentability Too
Broadly in Brüstle v. Greenpeace? 17–18 (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author), available at http://works.bepress.com/mark_nickas/2.
194. Id. at 18.
195. See id. at 19.
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the patentability of biotechnological inventions, rather than the
use of human embryos in scientific research.196 Restricting itself to the issue of patentability, the ECJ determined that
“clearly the grant of a patent implies, in principle, its industrial
or commercial application.”197 Therefore, even though the aim
of scientific research differs from industrial and commercial
purposes, “the use of human embryos for the purpose of research which constitutes the subject-matter of a patent application cannot be separated from the patent itself . . . .”198 Of note,
however, is that the ECJ excluded from this category inventions for therapeutic or diagnostic purposes that are applied for
the benefit of the human embryo itself.199
3. The Third Referred Question
The reasoning that the ECJ employed in considering the
first referred question would control its adjudication of the
third referred question. Even if a patent does not mention the
use of human embryos, the ECJ reasoned, where the implementation of the invention requires the destruction of human
embryos, it must also be unpatentable.200 As the ECJ stated:
The fact that destruction may occur at a stage long before the implementation of the invention, as in the case of the production of embryonic stem cells from a lineage of stem cells the mere production of
which implied the destruction of human embryos is, in that regard,
irrelevant.201

Collectively, therefore, the ECJ held that inventions are
excluded from patentability where they “require . . . the prior
destruction of human embryos or their use as base material.”202
As the ECJ stated, this conclusion is necessary, to some degree,
because without such exclusion, skillful drafting of patent applications could circumvent non-patentability.203
4. Ramifications of the Decision
At present, because the decision is relatively recent, the

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Brüstle, 2011 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 2599, ¶¶ 39–40.
Id. ¶ 41.
Id. ¶ 43.
See id. ¶ 46.
See id. ¶ 49.
Id.
Id. ¶ 52.
See id. ¶ 50.
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full ramifications of its prohibitions are not yet concretely
known. Yet, because the ECJ is the highest court in the EU,
meaning that its decisions are not appealable and are binding
upon all member states, Brüstle is considered immensely significant for stem cell researchers.204 Initially, criticism of the decision focused on the negative affect it was likely to have on research funding. Researchers contend that, without patent
protection for their developments, it will be difficult to secure
funding.205 Without the ability to secure funding, many researchers worry, efforts to develop viable hESC therapies will
be stifled.206
Many, however, believe that Brüstle will have only limited
ramifications. Chiefly, patents for stem cell technologies developed by EU researchers can still be applied for abroad.207 A
possible downside to the ability to patent abroad, some have
argued, is a potential “brain drain” in the EU in favor of more
“biotech-friendly” countries.208 Importantly, Brüstle does not
foreclose the ability to patent technologies related to hESC research, such as mechanisms and devices for delivering cells.209
The exclusions from patentability in the third referred
question have a troubling upshot. By extending the exclusion
from patentability to any invention that relies on the destruction of human embryos at a prior stage, the prohibition in
Brüstle also seems to include inventions based on established
cell lines.210 While established cell lines are not mentioned as

204. Alexander Denoon, Brüstle v. Greenpeace: Implications for Stem Cell
Research, 7 REGEN. MED. 85, 86 (2011).
205. See Nuala Moran, European Court Bans Embryonic Stem Cell Patents,
29 NATURE BIOTECH. 1057, 1057 (2011). See also David Holmes, Sound and
Fury after Stem Cell Ruling, 378 LANCET 1617, 1617 (2011) (“[T]he CJEU ruling would ‘make it less likely that companies in Europe will invest in the research to develop treatments to use embryonic stem cells for treatment of human diseases.’”).
206. Moran, supra note 205, at 1057.
207. Holmes, supra note 205, at 1617; Charlotte Harrison, EU Bans Embryonic Stem Cell Patents but Decision May Have Limited Implications, 10
NATURE 892, 893 (2011). But see Moran, supra note 205, at 1058 (noting that
some patents might not be applied for because, if EU researchers patent
abroad, they will have to disclose information that could otherwise be kept as
a trade secret in Europe).
208. Enrico Bonadio, Stem Cells Industry and Beyond: What is the Aftermath of Brüstle? 1 EUR. J. RISK REG. 93, 94 (2012).
209. Harrison, supra note 207, at 893; Moran, supra note 205, at 1059.
210. Berthold Rutz, From Bench to Market: Life Science Patents in Europe,
7 BIOTECHNOL. J. 171, 174 (2012).
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such in the ECJ opinion, this conclusion finds support in the
wide prohibition expressed in the ruling on this referred question.211 This concern, furthermore, raises the question of what
will become of current patents that rely, at some prior stage, on
the destruction of human embryos, perhaps from established
cell lines. A strong reading of Brüstle would cast doubt on the
enforceability of such patents post-Brüstle, which is to say that
the retroactive reach of the decision remains uncertain.212
B. PRACTICAL AND MORAL CONCERNS IN THE DIRECTIVE
1. Chronological Worries
The Directive, adopted in 1998 after over a decade of drafting, was an effort to harmonize biotechnology patent laws
amongst the EU Member States.213 It had economic motives,
aiming to foster progress in the EU biotechnology industry by
imbuing a fragmented patent law system with uniformity and
clarity.214 Much like Dickey-Wicker, the chronology of the drafting process suggests that the Directive could not possibly have
anticipated salient changes in hESC research that occurred in
1998, even though it would come to regulate this area vis-à-vis
patentability. While discussing Dickey-Wicker, I noted that
dominant bioethical concerns at that time turned on the possibility of human cloning, in light of the first successful cloning of
a mammal. Against the backdrop of human cloning worries, the
first direct reference to the human embryo in the drafting process of the Directive occurred in 1996, following rejection of its

211. See Brüstle, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 2599, ¶ 49 (“[A]n invention must be regarded as unpatentable [. . .] where the implementation of
the invention requires the destruction of human embryos. [. . .] The fact that
destruction may occur at a stage long before the implementation of the invention, as in the case of the production of embryonic stem cells from a lineage of
stem cells the mere production of which implied the destruction of human embryos is, in that regard, irrelevant.”).
212. See Moran, supra note 205, at 1059 (noting the argument that existing
patents would be difficult to enforce because anyone copying them would just
assert that the patent is not enforceable).
213. See Aurora Plomer et al., Challenges to Human Embryonic Stem Cell
Patents, 2 CELL STEM CELL 13, 15 (2008); Gerard Porter, The Drafting History
of the European Biotechnology Directive, in EMBRYONIC STEM CELL PATENTS:
EUROPEAN LAW AND ETHICS 3, 7–10 (Aurora Plomer & Paul Torremans eds.,
2009).
214. Porter, supra note 213, at 8.
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first draft in 1995.215 In fact, the Directive affords central import to human cloning worries, citing “processes for cloning
human beings” as the first specific example of an unpatentable
invention.216
2. Imprecise Normative Language
The Directive employs normative language to structure its
prohibitions, but it fails to provide sufficient guidance as to its
precise meaning. This lack of clarity, as it can be imagined, begets interpretive difficulties. This fact can be witnessed in
Brüstle, where the ECJ had to conjecture as to the meaning of
normative terminology in the Directive.217 While the decision of
the ECJ in Brüstle is easy to criticize, there is a sense in which,
given the poor design of the language in the Directive, the
ECJ’s broad construal of the patentability prohibitions could
not have been otherwise. By emphasizing the need for harmony
across Members States, without affording sufficient underlying
guidance, the Directive promotes the prioritization scheme expressed by the ECJ in its opinion, where an emphasis on harmonization hampers both normative and regulatory clarity.
Consider the way in which normative principles structure
prohibitions in the Directive. The Directive stresses that one of
its purposes is to exclude from patentability inventions whose
“commercial exploitation offends against ordre public or morality.”218 In an apparent effort to provide definitional clarity, the
Directive states that “ordre public and morality correspond to
ethical or moral principles recognised in a Member State.”219
The Directive likewise notes that the list of inventions it explicitly excluded from patentability is not to be regarded as comprehensive, but serves as a guidepost under the umbrella principle that other processes that “offend against human dignity”
are “obviously also excluded.”220 As an example of such exclu215. Porter, supra note 213, at 14, 18.
216. Directive, supra note 171, at 18 art. 6(2)(a).
217. See generally Brüstle, 2011 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 2599, ¶ 30 (noting that “the definition of human embryo is a very sensitive social issue in
many Member States, marked by their multiple traditions and value systems,”
but asserting that the court sought only to interpret the language of the Directive, and not to “broach questions of a medical or ethical nature”).
218. Directive, supra note 171, at 16 pmbl. 37.
219. Id. at 16 pmbl. 39.
220. Id. at 16 pmbl. 38. See id. at 18–19 art. 6(2)(a)–(d) (“[T]he following,
in particular, shall be considered unpatentable: (a) processes for cloning human beings; (b) processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity of hu-
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sions, the Directive specifies “processes to produce chimeras
from germ cells or totipotent cells of humans and animals.”221
The Directive’s use of normative principles—particularly,
“morality” and “human dignity”—admits of at least two arguments. First, as a foundational matter, we must ask whether
the use of normative principles is appropriate in legislation like
the Directive. If it is conceded that normative principles are in
fact appropriate in this context, then we can turn to the second
argument, which concerns how, and to what extent, guidance
should be offered as to the meaning of these principles. In considering whether normative principles are ever appropriate in
legislation like the Directive, it is crucial to bear the ultimate
objective of the Directive in mind. The Directive has a pragmatic intent, seeking to promote harmonization of biotechnological
patent protection across Member States.222 We can, therefore,
bracket dense concerns over the extent to which law and morality ought ever to intersect in the first place. If use of normative
principles in the Directive best advances its pragmatic intent,
then their inclusion would not be prima facie problematic.
For the Directive, however, use of normative principles
necessarily undercuts its intent to promote harmonization.
Considering first the use of the term “human dignity,” an inherently indeterminate moral concept, whether a particular
conception of the term applies to the life of the human embryo
depends on the specific moral and religious backgrounds of its
bearer.223 EU legislation has the unpropitious charge of respecting the oftentimes widely divergent social, cultural, and
religious backgrounds of its member states.224 Owing to diverse
backgrounds, member states do not all conceive of human dig-

man beings; (c) uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes;
(d) processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals which are likely to
cause them suffering without any substantial medical benefit to man or animal, and also animals resulting from such process.”).
221. Id. at 16 pmbl. 38.
222. See, e.g., id. at 13 pmbl. 3–7.
223. See Aurora Plomer, Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Article 6(1)
of the EU Directive on Biotechnological Inventions, in EMBRYONIC STEM CELL
PATENTS: EUROPEAN LAW AND ETHICS 203, 219 (Aurora Plomer & Paul Torremans eds., 2009).
224. See, e.g., Directive, supra note 171, at 16 pmbl. 36–37 (noting that the
Directive must stress the exclusion of patents that offend the ordre public, or
normative policy values, of member states).
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nity equally.225 This fact is witnessed in the diversity of moral
and religious perspectives represented across member states’
constitutions, laws, and regulations on bioethicial issues such
as IVF, embryo research, and abortion.226
The term “morality” in the Directive presents similar issues to those expressed in relation to “human dignity.” Viens
argues that use of the concept of morality within intellectual
property law is generally problematic.227 In the specific context
of biotechnological patents in the EU, the concept of morality
has been historically troublesome, owing to multiple uncertain
uses by the European Patent Office and its related institutions.228 Without a clear, uniform interpretation of morality in
the context of EU biotechnological patents, no general framework exists to provide guidance as to which inventions do or do
not offend against morality.229 Absent some shared conception
of morality and human dignity across member states, it is unclear how the intent to promote harmonization is best served by
relying on these normative principles.
Suppose, in the contrary, that member states in fact conceive these normative concepts equally or at least closely
enough so as to not encumber harmonization efforts. Even so,
the lack of definitional guidance in the Directive would beget
difficulties. Specifically, the Directive does not offer sufficient

225. Plomer, supra note 223, at 219. See Janne Rothmar Herrmann, The
Brüstlecase: Has the European Court of Justice Overstepped Its Competency
in Deciding the Status of the Embryo? 7 (Mar. 21, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2028307 (“Applying a common
ethical standard within a community such as the European Union does . . .
raise the question of how the respect for the Member States’ different cultural
and religious characteristics is maintained.”); Ciara Staunton, Brustle v
Greenpeace, Embryonic Stem Cell Research and the European Court of Justice’s New Found Morality, 21 Med. L. Rev. (forthcoming Winter 2013) (manuscript at 9–10) available at http://medlaw.oxfordjournals.org.ezp2.lib.umn.edu/
content/early/2012/08/06/medlaw.fws026.full.pdf+html (“It would have been
preferable if the ECJ had left Member States to each determine whether the
patenting of embryonic stem cell research is immoral based on its own moral
standards. While such a decision would be at the expense of harmonisation, it
would have more accurately reflected the differing policies in relation to embryonic stem cell research across Europe.”).
226. Plomer, supra note 223, at 219.
227. A. M. Viens, Morality Provisions in Law Concerning the Commercialization of Human Embryos and Stem Cells, in EMBRYONIC STEM CELL
PATENTS: EUROPEAN LAW AND ETHICS 85, 87 (Aurora Plomer & Paul Torremans eds., 2009).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 89.
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explication of the normative concepts it employs. The use of
undefined normative language, particularly with respect to the
concept of human dignity, has been criticized in other biotechnological contexts; for example, Caulfield and Ogbogu note the
suggestion that human dignity is often used as a mere slogan
or as a “vague placeholder for a variety of imprecise fears about
socially controversial science.”230 Along similar lines, Macklin
opines that, without criteria to determine when human dignity
has been violated, it “remains [a] hopelessly vague” concept.231
Read in view of the rich and varied interpretations of normative principles across European member states, it would be a
mistake to presume that such language admits a shared meaning.
There remains the issue of whether, even absent sufficient
definitional clarity, a particular stance on morality can be inferred from the Directive as it stands. This is an important
matter, not least because the existence of any particular moral
stance will bear on efforts to promote biotechnological harmonization across Member States. The text of the Directive catalogues myriad unpatentable inventions,232 to which I have previously referred. In doing so, the prohibitions in the Directive
come to encompass a wide gamut of unpatentable inventions.
For instance, processes for cloning human beings—whatever
these may be—and processes for modifying the germline genetic identity of human beings, both of which are cited in the Directive as unpatentable,233 are quite different things.
The expansive scope of the prohibitions in the Directive
suggests that the normative concepts employed therein can be
read as evincing a conservative stance on morality in the biotechnological sphere. Put differently, the reach of its prohibitions includes many of the specific biotechnological areas that
conservatives would consider morally questionable.234 This in230. Timothy Caulfield & Ubaka Ogbogu, Stem Cell Research, Scientific
Freedom and the Commodification Concern, 13 EUR. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY
ORG. 12, 12 (2011).
231. See Ruth Macklin, Dignity Is a Useless Concept, 327 BRIT. MED. J.
1419, 1420 (2003).
232. Directive, supra note 171, at 18–19 art. 6(2)(a)–(d).
233. See id. at 18 art. 6(2)(a)–(b).
234. Cf. REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., 2012 REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 41
(2012),
available
at
http://www.gop.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/
2012GOPPlatform.pdf (“We call for expanded support for the stem-cell research that now offers the greatest hope for many afflictions[—]with adult
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terpretation finds support in the ECJ’s wide construal of the
term ‘human embryo’ in the Directive.235 That the Directive reflects a conservative moral stance on biotechnology is not itself
problematic, at least not by virtue of it being conservative. It is,
however, problematic that the Directive reflects any particular
moral stance at all, whether conservative, progressive, or
transhumanist. If the chief intent of the Directive is to promote
biotechnological harmonization across member states, it must
respect the varying social, cultural, and religious traditions,
which bear on particular conceptions of morality, across member states. Insofar as the Directive embodies a singular approach to morality, it necessarily undercuts its efforts towards
harmonization.
3. The “Commodification” Issue
Commodification refers broadly to “turning something that
is not regarded as a commercial product into a product.”236 Far
from novel, commodification worries have factored prominently
in ethical discussions of biotechnology for decades.237 I will refer to the use of commodification worries in the biotechnological
context as the ‘argument from commodification.’ The trouble
with this argument will be apparent from the start. In point of
fact, the argument from commodification evades precise definition. In a broad sense, it opines that “certain moral . . . goods
are diminished or corrupted if bought or sold.”238
When applied in the context of biotechnological discussions, commodification worries are cast in terms of objectifying
human beings or parts of the human body, which is thought to
offend, inter alia, human dignity and the intrinsic moral worth
one would usually accord to such things.239 The Directive attends to these worries, rendering inventions unpatentable
stem cells, umbilical cord blood, and cells reprogrammed into pluripotent stem
cells-without the destruction of embryonic human life. We urge a ban on human cloning and on the creation of or experimentation on human embryos.”).
235. Brüstle, 2011 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 2599, ¶ 34; see id. ¶¶ 35–38.
236. Michele Garfinkel, Stem Cells, Morals and the Courts, 13 EUR.
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY ORG. 2, 2 (2012).
237. See generally MORENO, supra note 136, at 121–42 (tracing the issue of
commodification, in economic theory, to Marx’s early writings, and how it has
been recast in biotechnological arguments since early worries over human
cloning).
238. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF
MARKETS 111 (2012).
239. See Caulfield & Ogbogu, supra note 230, at 13.
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“where their commercial exploitation would be contrary to ordre public or morality.”240 More specifically, it excludes from
patentability “uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes.”241 In fact, Greenpeace framed its challenge
to Oliver Brüstle’s patent so as to invoke commodification worries.242
In the biotechnological context, however, the argument
from commodification is poorly defined. Caulfield and Ogbogu
contend that the argument is “rarely more nuanced than the
following: commodification is bad because it leads to commodification.”243 They opine that the vagueness with which the argument often proceeds “impedes and frustrates ethical reflection.”244 The Directive, to be sure, is not charged with guiding
ethical reflection, yet the appeal to the argument from commodification in its provisions becomes problematic when engaged as
grounds for patent prohibitions. As Veins notes, EU and national European advisory boards provide no formal definition of
commodification in conjunction with its use.245
Viens criticizes the argument from commodification in the
context of stem cell patents on the grounds that it does not respect differences between regulating patents themselves and
commercial activities that might occur beyond the grant of biotechnology patents, but instead conflates the two.246 Granting a
patent on stem cell related technologies implies “providing exclusive rights to the patent holder(s) to prohibit third parties
from exploiting [them] for industrial or commercial purposes.”247 While patenting such technologies might entail commercial application, or the bestowal of some commercial value, it
need not, which demonstrates that one should not make such a
presumption when evaluating the morality of such a patent.248
In Brüstle, the ECJ failed to make this distinction, conflating
worries over the commercialization of hESC patents with the

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Directive, supra note 171, at 18 art. 6(1).
Id. at 18 art. 6(2)(c).
See Garfinkel, supra note 236, at 2.
Caulfield & Ogbogu, supra note 230, at 14.
Id.
Viens, supra note 227, at 99.
See id. at 102.
Id.
Id. at 101–02.
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mere grant of the patents themselves.249
Viens’ critique of the argument from commodification holds
in the context of the Directive. The vague appeal to the argument from commodification in the Directive begets at least two
worries. First, the Directive does not provide guidance with regard to why certain biotechnological inventions offend against
commodification worries while others do not.250 In not providing such guidance, the Directive frustrates efforts to offer clear
guidelines for courts, lawyers, and researchers charged with
sorting out its applications. As a result, the aim of the Directive
to promote biotechnological harmonization across Member
States is once again stifled. Second, by appealing to the argument from commodification, the Directive demonstrates a troublesome fact about the nature of the appeal itself, namely, that
the argument from commodification is often used for “its rhetorical weight and persuasive force,”251 rather than for its
sound logic. Few would disagree, for instance, that exploiting
human embryos for commercial gain is morally objectionable.
In this sense, the Directive charms our common moral intuitions without demonstrating why such moral pangs ought to be
offended in the first place.
V. IPSCS AND FUTURE POLICY CHALLENGES
In this section, I begin by detailing critical differences between hESC and iPSC research. I then consider the extent to
which current policies are able to account for these critical differences. In closing, I survey the potentially problematic aspects of iPSC research, with the intention of defining the trajectory that future iPSC policies should follow.
A. ACCOUNTING FOR CRITICAL DIFFERENCES
Thus far I have considered weaknesses in two key pieces of
stem cell legislation, made apparent through their treatment
by judicial bodies in the US and EU. At its core, Dickey-Wicker
249. See Brüstle, 2011 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 2599, ¶¶ 41–43 (“[C]learly
the grant of a patent implies, in principle, its industrial or commercial application.”). A similar critique of the ECJ’s decision argues that it incorrectly
equated “for industrial or commercial purposes” with “[susceptible of] industrial application.” Nickas, supra note 193, at 20–21.
250. The argument from commodification has been generally criticized on
similar grounds, namely, that it rarely explicates the scope of commodification. See, e.g., Viens, supra note 227, at 99 n.40.
251. See Caulfield & Ogbogu, supra note 230, at 14.
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poses a fundamental, yet thorny, question, namely, may federal
funds be allocated to hESC research, which by nature entails
the destruction of human embryos?252 As I have noted, this
question has received manifold answers in the judiciary and by
three Presidential Administrations.253 The Directive, conversely, has enjoyed a far less tumultuous history, yet the crux of its
patent prohibition—namely, whether an invention that relies,
either directly or at some moment in its development, on the
destruction of human embryos, is patentable—plucks the very
same moral strings.254 Different though the nature of their regulations is, both Dickey-Wicker and the Directive share the
same concern over the morally contentious origins of hESC research.
Unlike hESC research, however, iPSC research does not
necessitate the destruction of human embryos.255 As a result,
iPSC research circumvents ethical worries vis-à-vis the moral
status of the human embryo. Even George and Tollefsen, who
have heavily criticized hESC research because, in their view,
human embryos are human beings and thus deserve full moral
respect, embrace the promise of iPSC research. As they state:
“iPS cells clearly offer the possibility of a research program for
regenerative medicine that does not require the destruction of
human beings in their earliest developmental stages. That is a
possibility to be embraced by all.”256 The importance of the ethically uncomplicated origins of iPSCs for current stem cell research policies cannot be overstated.
The prohibitions in Dickey-Wicker assume the destruction
of human embryos—after all, hESC research, which is the sole
focus of Dickey-Wicker, necessitates the destruction of human
252. See supra Part III.A.3.
253. See supra Part III.A.3–6.
254. See supra Part IV.A.
255. See Zacharias et al., supra note 16, at 637 (“Human embryos need
never be destroyed to obtain iPS cells, but their destruction is required to obtain hES cells.”). Zacharias et al. note that, in theory, iPSCs could be used to
create human embryos. Id. However, as they stress, “iPS technology does not
require or mandate the creation of human embryos.” Id. To guard against
abuse of iPSC technology by “maverick” scientists willing to risk both career
loss and legal action, they suggest “enact[ing] logical, universal policy with severe penalties to discourage potential misuse . . . .” Id. at 638. Paralleling IVF
technologies, which are not forbidden merely because of their potential contribution to cloning efforts, they argue that iPSC technologies should not be
hampered by theoretical abuses. Id.
256. GEORGE & TOLLEFSEN, supra note 35, at 222 (emphasis in original).
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embryos.257 As I have noted, hESC research will still remain
relevant, despite the emergence of iPSC research in recent
years.258 With that said, Dickey-Wicker—and all of its attendant flaws—will remain applicable to hESC research. For
iPSC research, however, Dickey-Wicker is irrelevant. It would
not preclude the availability of federal funding for iPSC research because this research neither entails the creation of
human embryos for research purposes nor constitutes research
in which human embryos are destroyed. As I will demonstrate
in the subsequent section, iPSC research has its own peculiar
ethical concerns, none of which are triggered by the central
prohibition in Dickey-Wicker.
For the Directive, the implications of the morally uncomplicated origins of iPSCs are less clear. As I considered
above,259 in Brüstle, the ECJ interpreted the meaning of ‘human embryo’ in the Directive in a wide sense.260 Vrtovec and
Scott argue that this broad interpretation, articulated with teleological language—“capable of commencing the process of development of a human being”261—is potentially troublesome for
future technologies like iPSCs.262 By using teleological language, rather than common embryological parlance, they contend, the broad definition “ignores the actions taken in order to
prove a cell can commence the process of human development.”263 The revelation that Brüstle rests on imprecise language should be unsurprising by this point. Vrtovec and Scott
note that some early developments in iPSC research, such as
the injection of murine iPSCs into tetraploid embryos, thereby
producing viable mice and satisfying an in vivo test, would
seem to fall within this teleological language.264 In short, they
worry that teleological language in Brüstle “would seem to extend to new technologies designed to overcome the very ethical
concerns [that the ECJ] is trying to avoid.”265
257. O’Quinn, supra note 26, ¶ 6.
258. See supra Part I.
259. See supra Part IV.A.1.
260. See Brüstle, 2011 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 2599, ¶ 34.
261. Id. ¶ 36.
262. Katja Triller Vrtovec & Christopher Thomas Scott, The European
Court of Justice Ruling in Brüstle v. Greenpeace: The Impacts on Patenting of
Human Induced Pluripotent Stem Cells in Europe, 9 CELL STEM CELL 502, 502
(2011).
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
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It is easy to see that reliance on unspecified and broad teleological language to define ‘human embryo’ could be problematic for iPSCs. In fact, debate already exists as to the measure
of moral worth that ought to be accorded to iPSCs, due in some
part to confusion over how early embryo development aligns
with teleological language not unlike that in Brüstle.266 Despite
the fact that iPSC research need not involve the destruction of
human embryos, some have posited that iPSCs ought to be accorded equivalent moral status to hESCs.267 As Watt and Kobayashi argue, however, this position is spurious.268 Those arguing for equal moral status between hESCs and iPSCs aver
that, because iPSCs appear to possess the same capacity as
hESCs to reach early differentiation stages, where individuation first occurs, they are functionally equivalent and thus deserve the same moral status as hESCs.269 Watt and Kobayashi
have a convincing counter to this position. They argue that the
special moral status of hESCs is “in virtue of their having the
potential to develop into adult human beings, not in virtue of
their capacity to achieve any particular early stage of embryonic development.”270
Apart from these concerns, iPSCs present other novel difficulties for the Directive. I have noted above that the Directive,
much like Dickey-Wicker, arose at a time in which policymakers could not have foreseen crucial hESC discoveries, let alone
subsequent iPSC discoveries.271 Unlike Dickey-Wicker, however, we have seen that the Directive structures its patent prohibitions in terms of the vaguely defined notion of human dignity,
which accounted for interpretive difficulties for the ECJ in
Brüstle.272 For patentability issues in iPSC research, this normative language seems likely to engender similar difficulties.
Although the ethically uncomplicated origins of iPSCs would
266. See, e.g., Julia C. Watt & Nao R. Kobayashi, The Bioethics of Human
Pluripotent Stem Cells: Will Induced Pluripotent Stem Cells End the Debate? 2
OPEN STEM CELL J. 18, 21 (2010) (noting the argument that “[b]ecause human
iPS cells appear to possess the same capacities as human ES cells . . . they are
thought to possess thesame embryo-like developmental capacity,” and may
therefore raise similar ethical concerns).
267. Id.
268. Id. at 21–22.
269. Id. at 21.
270. Id.
271. See supra Part IV.B.1.
272. See supra Part IV.B.2.
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not seem to offend against human dignity as construed in the
language of the Directive itself, in view of the ECJ’s broad rendering of ‘human embryo’ and the ensuing difficulties, courts
will be forced to grapple with potentially conflicting positions
on the patentability of iPSC technologies.
B. ANCILLARY ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
If iPSC research has ethically uncomplicated origins, the
question becomes: is there anything ethically problematic about
iPSC research? As we have witnessed, the extent to which a
type of stem cell research implicates ethically contentious issues bears a direct relation to the nature of its regulation. The
general consensus among commentators seems to be that, despite their ethically uncomplicated origins, iPSCs likely engender other ethical concerns.273 These ethical concerns surrounding iPSC research require a shift in perspective, such that
policymakers must now look to potential ethical complications
associated with downstream uses for iPSCs, rather than to
foundational concerns associated with the nature of iPSC research itself.
One area of growing concern for iPSC research turns on
somatic cell donor consent requirements. Aalto-Setälä et al.
propose significant changes to the somatic donor consent requirements that currently apply when researchers collect somatic cells in which to induce pluripotency.274 They point to potential future uses for iPSCs, such as in large-scale genome
sequencing and human-animal chimerism, which carry special
ethical considerations of which donors should be made
aware.275 Similarly, Brown argues that “[d]ownstream users of
products developed within a comparative pluripotency research
program . . . have an interest in avoiding complicity in practices
which they deem morally unacceptable.”276
Asking more of donor consent requirements in the instance
of iPSC research does not seem misplaced, given that the theoretical use of iPSCs is manifold. Notwithstanding a valid con273. See, e.g., Sipp, supra note 15, at 361 (“[I]t is unlikely that iPSCs will
be entirely free of ethical problems as they become more widely accessible.”).
274. See Katriina Aalto-Setälä et al., Obtaining Consent for Future Research with Induced Pluripotent Cells: Opportunities and Challenges, 7 PLOS
BIOLOGY 204, 206–07 (2009).
275. Id. at 205.
276. Mark Brown, No Ethical Bypass of Moral Status in Stem Cell Research, BIOETHICS (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 6).
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cern for the adequacy of informed consent for somatic cell donors, however, some of the particular sources of concern seem
to stretch the association between what is likely and what is
merely possible. For instance, while iPSCs could theoretically
be used for human-animal chimerism purposes, it seems much
more likely that initial uses for iPSCs will focus on advancing
the therapeutic purposes that hESCs have been so slow to provide.
It is worth noting that not all downstream uses for iPSCs
are ethically problematic. For instance, Holm notes that developments in iPSC research stand to lessen reliance on human
egg donation.277 Given that somatic cells are the only cells required for iPSC derivation, a simple cheek swab will suffice,
thus obviating the need to obtain human ova.278 Given the invasive nature of the egg donation process,279 lessening reliance
on human ova is medically relevant. Moreover, by lessening reliance on human ova, ethical concerns about the potential exploitation and coercion of egg donors are also greatly reduced.280
That current hESC-focused policies cannot account for ethical concerns surrounding potential downstream uses for iPSCs
should be unsurprising. Even the Directive, which explicitly excludes from patentability inventions related to, inter alia, cloning human beings and “processes for modifying the germ line
genetic identity of human beings,”281 does not account for the
multitude of potential downstream uses for iPSCs that might
be ethically problematic. To no small degree, the ability to fulfill the unrealized potential of hESC research will depend on
the careful balancing of iPSC research policies. While it might
well be easy to isolate those downstream uses about which
most would feel some moral trepidation, the challenge becomes
demarcating just how far regulatory prohibitions ought to extend, without needlessly stifling our ethic of healing.

277. Søren Holm, Time to Reconsider Stem Cell Ethics—The Importance of
Induced Pluripotent Cells, 34 J. MED. ETHICS 63, 63 (2008), available at
http://jme.bmj.com/content/34/2/63.full.pdf+html.
278. Watt & Kobayashi, supra note 266, at 22.
279. Holm, supra note 277, at 63.
280. Id.; Watt & Kobayashi, supra note 266, at 22.
281. Directive, supra note 171, at 18 art. 6(2).
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C. THE UBIQUITOUS SPECTER OF COMMODIFICATION
The fact that iPSC research does not involve the destruction of human embryos would seem, at first blush, to negate the
applicability of the argument from commodification. For, if
iPSC research circumvents disagreement over the moral status
of the human embryo, how can commodification worries like
those expressed in the context of hESC research continue to obtain? As I noted in the previous section, however, downstream
uses for iPSCs add a salient wrinkle to the less ethically complicated status of iPSCs.282 If iPSCs successfully increase access
to pluripotency, downstream research activities might accelerate. As Sipp opines: “[P]luripotency has not only become a
commodity, it is becoming a disposable one.”283 Moreover, given
rapid progress in iPSC research, coupled with low regulatory
entry barriers, the likelihood is high that unforeseen new applications for iPSCs will emerge.284
The argument from commodification is inherently bound
up with downstream uses because the scope of the argument is
itself so broad. As Watt and Kobayashi observe, the argument
from commodification is not premised on the “literal buying and
selling of human parts,” but on “the erosion of respect for the
inherent value and dignity of human life that results when
people start to view the constituents of human life (including
embryos, gametes, somatic cells, and genes) in instrumental
terms.”285 On their view, iPSC research would encourage people
to conceive iPSCs in terms of their instrumental value, namely,
vis-à-vis their value to specific research objectives.286 Importantly, they conclude that, for similar reasons, iPSCs would
not be immune from commodification worries in the context of
patentability.287
Even if the argument from commodification persists, it is a
quite different matter to say that it has a place in future policymaking. I have already demonstrated that the argument
from commodification is deeply flawed and has only served to
further complicate development of effective stem cell policies.288

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

See supra Part V.B.
Sipp, supra note 15, at 362.
Id. at 361.
Watt & Kobayashi, supra note 266, at 22.
See id.
See id.
See supra Part IV.B.3.
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Policymakers must distinguish between regulating iPSC research itself and regulating downstream uses for iPSCs. While
the latter might trigger commodification worries, the former
need not. However, if future policies ignore this distinction, instead conflating iPSCs with ethically complicated downstream
technologies, unnecessary restrictions might result. This concern is not unfounded. For instance, as I considered above, the
Directive conflates commodification worries with the purpose
for granting a patent, which results in improper limitations being placed on the patentability of hESC technologies.289 For
iPSC research, allowing worries regarding downstream uses to
dictate overall iPSC policy would impede efforts to realize the
technology’s full therapeutic potential.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article, I have endeavored to surface the flaws of
current stem cell policies. I have, moreover, stressed that these
flaws run much deeper than one might suspect, such that current policies are unfit to account for future challenges posed by
iPSCs. In closing, I wish to stress a concern that emanates from
the contextual points with which this article began. As the
spectrum of biotechnological activities continues to widen, our
ethic of healing will only further quarrel with the bounds imposed by moral inquiry. To conceive of the legislative difficulties that beset stem cell research as isolated and unique would
be a hopelessly parochial characterization of the trajectory of
modern biotechnological advancements.
None of this, however, is to suggest that moral inquiry
should or should not reign in our ethic of healing. The ready
willingness with which we intuit the worth of our ethic of healing seems equal to the ease with which our shared sense of
moral concern motivates us to ask certain questions. The push
and pull of moral inquiry against our ethic of healing, although
sometimes difficult to justify, is ultimately necessary. As I have
shown in the instance of stem cell research, the challenge for
science policy is to exhibit a sound understanding of the underlying science, so as to properly define the moral inquiries that
will necessarily be implicated in any regulatory schema. For
advancements in stem cell research, as with any biotechnology,
the extent to which our ethic of healing is to yield therapeutic
289. See supra Part IV.B.3.
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benefits will ultimately be dependent on the maintenance of
policies that do not carelessly appeal to broad or irrelevant ethical worries.

